If cities grew at random the problem of the creation, distribution and shifting of land values would be insoluble. A cursory glance reveals similarities among cities, and further investigation demonstrates that their structural movements, complex and apparently irregular as they are, respond to definite principles. The basis of this similarity is that the same factors create all modern cities; commerce and manufactures, with political and social forces, being everywhere operative, the chief difference in influence coming from variations in their relative power. [HURD 1903]
The Second National Conference on City Planning and the Problems of Congestion (..) met in Rochester, NY, on May 2–4, 1910. Marsh attended, but Olmsted dominated the proceedings. (..) Modern city planning hoped “to exercise a large control” over the “enormously complex” and “half understood forces” that shaped city development. (,.). He advocated, therefore, that the conference should advance city planning itself, not social welfare, not beautification, nor any other singular goal. Rather, it should illuminate “the connections which link the planning of all the diverse elements of the physical city together” and give each participant “a more intelligent understanding of the purposes and principles” at work “in the less familiar parts of the field.” It should also “open the way for substantial advances in each one of the subdivisions of the field, through better knowledge of facts, through clearer definition of purposes, and through improvements of technique”. In all, this represented a novel and historically significant way of thinking. Read as a declaration, Olmsted’s address marks the birth of American city planning as a field of public endeavor. [PETERSON 2009, p. 129]
It is these costs of friction [transportation cost and site rental] which the city planner must seek to reduce to the lowest possible level; of two cities otherwise alike, the better planned, from the economic point of view, is the one in which the costs of friction are less. [HAIG 1926, p. 423]
The premise upon which the current studies are being made is that the city is, after all, a natural phenomenon. As such, it is obedient to natural laws. Its growth is a natural growth, and the changes wrought by growth by careful observation can be classified and the natural laws governing them discovered. [MCMICHAEL e BINGHAM 1928]
Urban geography is not about planning. It is concerned with certain aspects of the inherent spatial or geographical structure of society on which planning must be based [DICKINSON R 1947 xiii)
So long as the market, circumscribed as it may be by public policy, is the principle machinery allocating urban space among competitive use, this interaction will be the dominant city shaping force in our society." [WINGO 1961, p.93]
O urbanismo moderno não nasceu junto com o processo técnico e econômico que gerou e modelou a cidade industrial. Veio mais tarde, quando se evidenciou que os efeitos quantitativos dessas transformações se tornaram conflitantes a ponto de tornar inevitável a necessidade de remediá-los. [De modo geral, a técnica urbanística aparece com atraso relativamente aos acontecimentos que tem por missão controlar e guarda um caráter curativo. [BENEVOLO 1963]
Para uma compreensão completa da estrutura das cidades modernas devemos relaxar as hipóteses de livre mercado e tomar explicitamente em conta o planejamento urbano e as decisões do poder público. [RICHARDSON 1969]
El Plan de la Ribera muestra, una vez más, como en un sistema económico capitalista la clase dominante adapta la ciudad a sus necesidades mientras que la admnistración hace posible esta actuación aún encontra de los intereses del pueblo. Por lo cual novamente se evidencia que los problemas urbanos tienen amplias raíces políticas, y que todo intento de realizar un plan urbanístico verdaderamente social es imposible dentro del marco de la sociedade capitalista. [TATJER 1973, p 91.]
Planning is important, but planning disasters are frequent due to a combination of uncertainty about future socio-economic developments, interest-based conflicts among key stakeholders, and shifting preferences and value judgements among the public and associated opinion formers. [HALL 1980]
Almost precisely in 1900, as a reaction to the horrors of the 19th century slum city, the clock of planning history started ticking. But, paradoxically, as it did so, another much older and bigger timepiece started to drown it out. The very problem, that the infant planning movement sought to address, almost instantly began to change its shape. Most of the philosophical founders of the planning movement continued to be obsessed with the evils of the congested Victorian slum city – which indeed remained real enough, at least down to World War Two, even to the 1960s. But all the time, the giant city was changing, partly through the reaction of legislators and local reformers to these evils, partly through market forces. The city dispersed and concentrated. [HALL 1988]
Industry now plans on a colossal scale: the production of a new model of a car, or a personal computer, has to be worked out long in advance of its appearance in the shops. And all this is true whatever the nature of the economic system. Wether labeled free enterprise of social democratic or socialist, no society on earth today provides goods and services for its people, or schools and colleges for its children, without planning. One might regret it and wish for a simpler age when perhaps things happens without forethought; if that age ever existed it, has gone forever. [The reason is the fact of life everybody knows: that modern society is immeasurably more complex, technically and socially, than previous societies. [HALL 1996, p.2]
Modern urban and regional planning has arisen in response to specific social and economic problems, which in turn were triggered off by the Industrial Revolution at the end of the eighteen century. it is important to note that these problems did not all come at once, in the same form; they chanted in character, and in their relative importance, so that the questions uppermost in the minds of city-dwellers in the 1930s were by no means the same as those experienced by their great-grandfathers in the 1840s. As problems were identified, solutions were proposed for them; but because of the inertia of people's minds, and still more the inertia of social and political processes, these solutions - especially the more radical ones - might not be put into action until decades afterwards, when the problem itself had changed in character and perhaps also in importance. [HALL 1996, p. 12, Cap 2, “The Origins”.]
A minority of thinking people, however, were alarmed at the result. They included both town planners, who by then existed as a profession (..), and rural conservationists. They were concerned at the fact that the development was uncontrolled by any sort of effective planning. (The Town Planning Institute had been incorporated in 1914). (..) Thus a small, but powerful and vocal, movement built up to limit urban growth through positive planning. [HALL, 1996, p 27, Cap 2, "The Origins"]
Explicações sobre a inexistência de uma orla verticalizada em Salvador baseadas em restrições da legislação urbanística municipal não convencem. Trata-se de processos sociais que se desenvolvem por muitas décadas e que determinam a legislação urbanística em vez de serem determinados por ela. Imaginar que a legislação urbanística possa dobrar os interesses de um poderosíssimo setor de mercado - o setor imobiliário - é uma ilusão. Num país de Estado fraco como o Brasil, especialmente na esfera municipal e mais ainda no Nordeste, é ilusório imaginar que uma frágil lei municipal, defendida apenas por um punhado de bem-intencionados funcionários municipais, possa derrotar os interesses de dois poderosos grupos por tanto tempo: os proprietários da classe média-alta e alta e o setor imobiliário. [VILLAÇA, 2001]
Não é possível associar aqui a aglomeração urbana à desordem da concorrência que Marx diz existir na sociedade. Numa visão social mais ampla, as cidades são uma força produtiva e, como tal, trabalham segundo uma lei, uma lógica, e não em desordem” [VILLAÇA 2001, p.77].
In Town and Regional Planning, Peter Hall, another Englishman, similarly commented on both the strangeness (as he saw it) of U.S. planning and the key role of U.S. zoning: “To many Europeans, even well-informed ones, planning in the United States is a contradiction in terms” (2002, 189). He also noted that “the real core of the American system of land-use control is not planning, but zoning” (205). [HIRT 2014]
Urban spatial structures are shaped by market forces interacting with regulations, primary infrastructure investments and taxes. [Can urban planners influence a city spatial structure? Should they? Should urban planners attempt to change a city’s spatial structure in order to improve a city’s performance in a particular sector such as transport, the environment or access to jobs by the poor? The chances to do so are rather limited and they are long range, but they nevertheless exist. A planner has three tools at his disposal to influence city shape: land use regulations, infrastructure investments and taxation. However, to use these tools effectively, clearly established objectives must be formulated by elected officials. Because there is no optimum city shape per se, a city shape can be “improved” only in relation to priority objectives. Priorities, however, may change with time, while cities’ shapes are very resilient. [BERTAUD 2004]
El conocimiento e identificación de la fase de desarrollo en que se encuentra cada sector de una ciudad es igualmente importante para los organismos de planeación de esa ciudad para saber en qué momento conviene adoptar una determinada política para estimular un proceso de rehabilitación, de renovación o de desarrollo de un sector. (..) Cuando la planeación urbana va en contra de las necesidades sociales y las leyes del mercado, genera un mayor caos urbano. La planeación debe ir delante de la demanda encauzando las necesidades. [BORRERO 2005]
“Brasília é talvez o exemplo máximo da falência do planejamento urbano no Brasil. Quando vejo que esse mesmo processo aconteceu em Belo Horizonte setenta anos antes, fico muito desapontado. Em Brasília, como em Belo Horizonte nas primeiras décadas do século XX, a parte planejada da cidade ficou sub ocupada, por décadas, enquanto a cidade crescia fora da parte planejada. Em ambas as cidades dentro de poucas décadas a população que vivia fora do plano já era bem maior que aquela dentro do plano. Então para que plano? (..) Não há planejamento imune à desigualdade social.” [VILLAÇA 2005].
La crisis del fordismo urbano se manifiesta, sobre todo, a través de dos ejes de cambio: por una parte, la tendencia hacia la flexibilización urbana por sobre el urbanismo modernista y regulador; y por otra, la caída en el financiamiento estatal de la materialidad urbana (vivienda, equipamientos e infraestructura) y de algunos servicios urbanos colectivos. En ambos casos, el mercado resurge como mecanismo principal de coordinación de la producción de la ciudad, ya sea a través de la privatización de las empresas públicas o por la hegemonía del capital privado en la producción de las materialidades residenciales y comerciales urbanas. Este predominio del mercado como mecanismo de coordinación de las decisiones de uso del suelo constituye un rasgo característico de la ciudad neoliberal, en contraste con el periodo del fordismo urbano, cuando el papel del mercado en la producción de las materialidades urbanas estaba fuertemente mediado por el Estado a través de la definición tanto de las reglas de uso del suelo como de las características de tales materialidades. La crisis del fordismo urbano implica, por tanto, el “retorno del mercado” como elemento determinante en la producción de la ciudad neoliberal. [ABRAMO 2012]
In his classic 1986 book Planning the Capitalist City, Richard Foglesong analyzes the relationship between capitalism and city planning as it evolved in the United States from the colonial period through the 1920s. He frames the book around two primary contradictions: one he calls “the property contradiction,” and the other “the capitalist-democracy contradiction.”
The property contradiction arises because capitalists demand certain planning interventions from the state to enable their mode of accumulation, but then deny the utility of planning as some sort of socialist sickness. Crucially, beyond certain fundamentals, urban capitalists do not want the same things from city planners. (..)
According to this model, urban planners’ main job is to contain these two contradictions; neither can be resolved, but both can be managed. It’s a complicated bind. They are supposed to make certain land use interventions, but are prevented from making more sweeping changes. Their process must be open to the public, while simultaneously guaranteeing that ultimate power resides in the hands of propertied elites. It can be a pretty shitty job. [STEIN 2019]
Physical planning of urban developments is extremely complex due to conflicting pressures on land use, contradictory socio-economic dynamics, uncertain prognoses and outcomes, multi-level governance structures, and limited public planning capacities. In addition, comprehensive planning of housing and supportive infrastructures often fails because planning experts dream up ambitious master plans that have little or no bearing on local conditions, knowledge, and needs and only enjoy modest political and popular support. Finally yet importantly, socio-economic turbulence, shifting political priorities, and bureaucratic resistance may undermine stated planning objectives and preferred strategies for how to attain them. [SØRENSEN e TORFING 2019]
The Finger Plan built on the assumption that growth in business and housing was inevitable and impossible to stop (Regional Planning Office 1947). [SØRENSEN e TORFING 2019, p. 227]
Es innegable que la ciudad moderna, producto de la revolución industrial, es distinta de cualquier tipo de ciudad anterior. Lo es porque es el espacio de concentración de los factores de producción, sobre todo del capital y la mano de obra y, por tanto, es el espacio de la reproducción de la fuerza de trabajo, por lo que favorece el incremento de productividad del trabajo y la rentabilidad del capital. [Pero lo es también porque ha concentrado en ella los factores de producción sobre la base de un nuevo sistema económico basado en el capital. Y en ese sentido, la ciudad es también un producto en sí misma, una sumatoria de mercancías inmobiliarias que añaden valor a la propiedad. Si la propia construcción de ciudad se convierte en negocio, en motor de desarrollo económico a través de la multiplicación del capital, es obvio que se ha tendido progresivamente a ampliar el campo de la producción inmobiliaria, del territorio de generación de plusvalía por su proximidad a los factores de producción. [HERCE VALLEJO 2021]
A relação entre o mercado e o Estado tem sido tradicionalmente entendida como um esquema de três camadas. O Estado garante os direitos de propriedade e outras pré-condições dos mercados. Os mercados operam dentro desta estrutura e oferecem resultados eficientes. O Estado corrige as falhas do mercado por meio de instituições complementares como, em alguns casos, políticas de bem-estar social. A gestão das cidades não é diferente e questões como o desenvolvimento econômico, acessibilidade a bens e serviços, mobilidade, sustentabilidade, liberdade e bem-estar, dependem da relação entre os mercados e o Estado. [JARDIM 2021]
(..) los problemas de la ciudad parecieran tener soluciones biunívocas que deberán plasmarse en un plan de desarrollo a implementar. Lamentablemente, la fórmula casi nunca funciona por el hecho de que la ciudad es un sistema complejo de interrelaciones en constante transformación. Entonces, es necesario cuestionar y desconfiar de todo determinismo. Es prácticamente imposible que cualquier instrumento de planeación, ley o reglamento, regule el sistema urbano de forma tal que elimine la totalidad de las causas que generan la totalidad de las consecuencias. Es por ello que los planes —y sus creadores— necesariamente deben de reconocer su falibilidad —es decir la posibilidad de autoengañarse o equivocarse—, al tiempo en que deben establecer mecanismos que regulen beneficios y compensen los costos generados por las consecuencias de aquello que no pudo ser previsto. [PELTIER 2021]
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REFERÊNCIASBERTAUD Alain, “The Spatial Organization of Cities: Deliberate Outcome or Unforeseen Consequence?”. Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of California at Berkeley, Working Paper 2004-01
HERCE VALLEJO Manuel, “Las infraestructuras en la construcción de la ciudad capitalista”. Café de las Ciudades Abril 2021
https://labrujula.nexos.com.mx/la-trampa-del-determinismo-en-la-planeacion/
PETERSON J A, “The Birth of Organized City Planning in the United States, 1909–1910”. Journal of the American Planning Association, Spring 2009, 75:2, pp. 123-133.
https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198843719.001.0001/oso-9780198843719-chapter-12
STEIN Samuel, “Gentrification Is a Feature, Not a Bug, of Capitalist Urban Planning”, Jacobin 2019-03-12
VILLAÇA, F. Espaço Intra-Urbano no Brasil, Capítulo 8: "Os bairros residenciais das camadas de alta renda", Nota 15. p 224. São Paulo 2001: Studio Nobel; FAPESP; Lincoln Institute
